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FALSE PREMISES IN WELFARE AND SOCIAL
SECURITY: CONTINUING OBSTACLES
TO REFORM
INTRODUCTION

The American governmental assistance maze needs sweeping reform. Federal programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Social Security, and state assistance subsidies overlap
and yet leave gaps through which the unfortunate may fall.' Benefits
and eligibility requirements of the programs vary widely from state to
3
state 2 and their administration is both awkward and complex.
Previous administrations and legislators attempted reform,4 but despite widespread agreement on the need for change,5 none of the proposed comprehensive reforms were adopted. The welfare system
continues, with minor revisions, essentially unchanged. Legislators,
fearful of public disapproval, shy away from major changes, especially
in election years.
The American public and many legislators hold an inaccurate view
of government aid programs. Views they hold are often based on
myths which create and maintain illogical categories of deserving and

undeserving recipients. According to one myth, people receiving benefits from programs such as AFDC generally do not deserve aid, but
1.
2.

See Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, 35 PuB. WELFARE 17, 18 (Spring 1977).
Thus, using the most well known cash assistance programs, an unemployed father may draw
Aid to Families with Dependent Children for Unemployed Parents (AFDC-UP) or General
Assistance (GA) and food stamps in Michigan, as well as associated medical assistance, but
be ineligible for benefits other than food stamps and discretionary help from the local township trustee in Indiana. See also P. SOMMERS, WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 15 (1982).

3.
4.
5.

This fact takes on significant implications in light of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89
S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1969). In Shapiro, the Supreme Court held that the right of
citizens to travel throughout the United States is a basic right under the Constitution unless
there is a compelling governmental interest to restrain this right. In this case, the Court
found a statute requiring a one year residency in order to draw welfare benefits unconstitutional. The Supreme Court then went on to state in dicta:
[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. Implicit in any such distinction is
the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of securing higher welfare
benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not take this consideration
into account. But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life
for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among other factors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother
is no less deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take
advantage of its better educational facilities.
Id. at 631-32.
See Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, supra note 1.
See generally L. LYNN, JR. & D. WHITMAN, THE PRESIDENT AS POLICY MAKER (1980); V.
BURKE & V. BURKE, NIXON'S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM (1974).
L. SOBEL, WELFARE & THE POOR 1-2 (1977).
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everyone else receiving government assistance not only deserves it, but
also earned it.
For example, members of the public see Social Security as something they earned and are entitled to receive. Students from families in
all income brackets eagerly obtain guaranteed student loans6 and allow
the government to pay the interest on the loan while the student is in
school. Qualified middle class homeowners receive federally guaranteed mortgages to help them buy homes through the Federal Home
Administration. 7 The trucking industry benefits from a publicly established and maintained highway system to help it compete with railroads. 8 These benefits are lower on a scale of human needs than a
person's need to be fed and housed. Thus, the prevailing myths categorizing recipients as "deserving" or "undeserving" virtually preclude
comprehensive reform.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: PAST ADMINISTRATIONS'
ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
President Johnson, speaking at the 1964 University of Michigan
commencement, announced that it would be the goal of his Administration and this country to make a Great Society - one in which poverty was to be eliminated from the face of America in our time.9
Thereafter, varieties of the Negative Income Tax (NIT)' ° appeared in
disguised forms in the 1960's and early 1970's. They were offered as a
remedy for poverty during the Johnson Administration" and as welfare reform measures under both the Nixon' 2 and Carter

Administrations. 13

In 1969, President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan
(FAP), which included both a guaranteed income for families and
wage supplements for poor fathers.14 President Carter presented a Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) that proposed a guaranteed
income plan based on a negative income tax (NIT).' 5 Both reform attempts failed and poverty still existed although massive welfare programs were in operation.
While comprehensive reform was being offered by the Carter Administration in PBJI, incremental changes were offered in bills by both
the House and the Senate. Representative Al Ullman (D-Ore.), Chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee, drafted incremental
6.

20 U.S.C. §§ 421-425, 427-429 (1976).

7.
8.

12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
23 U.S.C. §§ 101-104 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

9.

Address by President Johnson, University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony (May 22,
1964) reprintedin 18 ANN. OF AMERICA 216-18 (1968).
See L. LYNN & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4.
See V. BURKE & V. BURKE, supra note 4, at 141.
See L. LYNN & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, at 20.
Id at 263.
See V. BURKE & V. BURKE, supra note 4, at xvii.
See L. LYNN & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, at 263.

10.
1I.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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changes in House bill 10711.16 In the Senate, the Baker-Bellman bill, 7
and the Kennedy bill' 8 proposed incremental changes, while the Moynihan-Long bill proposed a block grant approach. 19
The change in administrations brought back an incremental approach under President Reagan. Congress passed the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 198120 implementing incremental changes including revised budgeting and eligibility requirements for AFDC. 2
These changes by the Reagan Administration cut the welfare budget to
eliminate abuses in the welfare system. Studies are currently analyzing
the impact of Reagan's budget revisions on the nation's needy.22 Presently, however, no major reform measures are on the horizon,2 3 and
some writers suggest that welfare reform is politically impossible2 4 because of the large number of people with vested interests in existing
welfare programs.25 To fully understand why the welfare system has
evaded so many comprehensive reform measures, first it is necessary to
examine the social attitudes, norms and mores underlying the present
system.
Defining Welfare
The welfare problem begins with the definition.
Public welfare is the term usually used to describe income maintenance
programs, medical aid, and social services provided to certain categories of needy people. Over the years, the term has gradually been ex16.

H.R. 10711, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 2141 (1978). H. R. 10711 was designed to
amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, parts A and C of title IV of the Social Security
Act, and the Food Stamp Act of 1977 for the purpose of revising, coordinating, and improving federal public assistance and food stamp programs and for the purpose of providing
increased employment opportunities for needy families, and for other purposes. 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1751 (1978). For a general overview of reform during this period,
see FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, INC., GUIDE TO WELFARE REFORM 33-34, 39

(1979).
S. 2777, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 8061 (1978). S. 2777 was drafted by Howard
Baker, R-Tenn., Henry Bellmon, R-Okla., John Danforth, R-Mo., and Abraham Ribicoff,
D-Conn.
18. S. 3498, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 29417 (1978).
19. S. 3505, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 30090 (1978).
20. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified as
amended 31 U.S.C. § 1331).
21. 31 U.S.C. §§ 2303-06, 2309, 2312-2315, 2319 (1981).
22. See T. Joe, Profiles of Families in Poverty: Effects of the FY 1983 Budget Proposals on the
Poor (Feb. 25, 1982) (unpublished manuscript available through The Center for the Study of
Social Policy, Washington, D.C.).
23. Apparently neither the House nor Senate plans further action for major welfare reform other
than attempts to establish stricter child enforcement provisions. Interview with Sydney Olsen, Staff Member of the Senate Finance Office, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 15, 1983). Interview with Allen Jensen, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Public Assistance and
Unemployment Compensation, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 17, 1983). For example, presently the Congress is considering H.R. 4325, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), a bill designed to
deal with the problem of parents neglecting their child support responsibilities. See Federal
Funds Trimmed Gradually: Finance Compromise Sends Child Support Bill to Senate, 42
CONG. Q. 737 (Mar. 31, 1984).
24. W. Albrecht, Welfare Reform" An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone, in WELFARE RE17.

FORM IN AMERICA 15, 16 (P. Sommers ed. 1982).

25.

Id. at 17.
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panded - it originally applied exclusively to cash assistance or relief
programs - until it now is frequently used to describe a network of
government programs designed to protect the economic security,
health and social well-being of all citizens. In the broadest sense, the
term public welfare may even be defined as governmental stimulation
of employment opportunities; the distribution of national income
through taxes, subsidies, or income support programs; insurance
against the loss of earnings; health care; and a wide range of efforts
aimed at improving the quality of life.2 6
Thus the term welfare includes a much broader category of programs
than "welfare" is normally thought to encompass. 27 Social Security,
though not generally considered welfare, provides millions of people
with an annual income far beyond the beneficiary's original contribution, 2 based partially on recipients' actual or legislatively perceived
needs. Social Security, however, has not been included by legislators
or the population at large in the definition of welfare. American society has created a two-tier system that defines some recipients as deserving and others as undeserving.
Defining the Welfare Population
The current system divides the welfare population into the "worthy
poor" and the "unworthy poor."" The "worthy poor" are those who
are unable, through age, blindness, or disability to care for themselves.
Assistance is provided to these worthy poor with minimal verification
requirements under Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).3°
The others, the "unworthy poor", are eligible to receive assistance
only if they fit into a specific legislatively defined category. 3 They also
must meet a multitude of income, financial, and additional qualifications that are not required of a person drawing Social Security benefits.
Thus, in some states an individual attempting to collect welfare benefits
must prove that a child resides with him or her in the home and that
the other spouse is absent before he or she will be considered for cash
assistance benefits.3 2 Only then will the individual's actual financial
26.
27.

Introduction, 35 PUB. WELFARE 5 (Spring 1977).
In 1977, the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies found 182 different programs operating
under the broad title of assistance programs to eliminate poverty. See L. Greene, Foreword

to G.

WELLS, THE WELFARE DEBATE OF

1978, at vii (1978).

R. Myers & B. Schobel, .4Money's Worth Analysis of Social Security Retirement Benefits
(manuscript to be published in TRANSACroNs); Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
29. This classification evolved from the Elizabethan Poor Laws and remains to the present day.
See J. Hansen, The Role of Government in American Social Welfare 2 (February 1982)
(unpublished manuscript) (available through the National Conference on Social Work)
(hereinafter cited as Role of Government].
30. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.701-.780, 416.901-.998 (1983).
31. These include such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), General
Assistance if available, or other state assistance programs.
32. For example, Indiana has chosen not to adopt Aid to Families with Dependent ChildrenUnemployed Parent (AFDC-UP). Thus an unemployed family with the father in the home
would not be able to draw cash assistance for rent, clothing or needed items other than

28.
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status be considered and his level of benefits determined. Finally, the
individual must show that other resources were unavailable and may
have to agree to fulfill work requirements before receiving cash
benefits.33
Some sociologists classify welfare recipients as the "disreputable
poor."
This class includes the permanently unemployed, the homeless, the illiterate, the chronic welfare recipient, and the impoverished aged.
They are virtually worthless on the labor market and so are virtually
worthless in terms of power and prestige as well. . . . Members of
this class are poorly regarded by other Americans. Their supposed laziness, promiscuity, or reliance on public handouts are contrasted with
the morality of the middle class. They tend to lack a common class
consciousness, to be alienated from and cynical
about society and to be
34
fatalistic about their own chances in life.
Stigmatizing members of this class as "welfare recipients" suggests that
they would not need assistance if they sought employment. Little evidence indicates that they could obtain employment.3 5
These pervasive public misunderstandings of welfare programs and
welfare recipients have created a significant obstacle to welfare reform.
These myths and definitional problems are subtly recognized and reflected in the legislation outlining the assistance programs. An analysis
of two of these programs, AFDC and Social Security, illustrates how
these underlying misconceptions hinder true reform.
AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Since its inception in 1935 under the Social Security Act, 36 the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)3 7 program has become
the single most controversial portion of the needs-based welfare programs.38 Unlike Social Security, AFDC enjoys little public support.
Over the years this program, perhaps the classic example of "welfare",
has generated immeasurable criticism from liberal and conservative
politicians, Republicans and Democrats, front line caseworkers at local
through the local township trustee. This type of assistance is limited to emergency needs
where no other resources are available and certain residency requirements are met. IND.
33.
34.
35.

CODE ANN. § 12-2-1-1 to 12-2-1-39 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983-84).
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) added
work requirements to AFDC. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
I. ROBERTSON, SOCIOLOGY 246 (1977) (citations omitted).
See H. Jones, The Problem Is (No) Jobs, 38 PuB. WELFARE 27 (1980). "Full employment is

defined by federal economists as the circumstance that pertains when the unemployment rate
stands at 4 percent to 5 percent. This policy confirms structural unemployment as a permanent feature in our society and excludes at least four million of our citizens from the work
force." Id.
36.
37.
38.

Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current versions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3011397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (current version
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE 1970's 28 (rev. ed. 1973).
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Social Service offices and welfare recipients.39 Both AFDC administrators and welfare study groups criticize the programs on the theoretical
as well as the practical levels.'
Despite the acknowledged need for reform, viable alternatives have
not been developed to reform AFDC. One fundamental reason for the
lack of reform is the general public misconception of how the program
has come to exist as it does today.
The Advent of AFDC
With the Industrial Revolution in the 1600's came a great socioeconomic upheaval. 4 Elizabethan society found it could no longer provide for the poor on a "piece-meal" voluntary basis as determined by
local law and charities. The problem of providing for the poor had
become too big and too varied to be handled by voluntary charity.42
Parliament addressed the problem by enacting the Poor Laws from
which American notions of welfare descended.4 3
The Great Depression of the 1930's 44 stimulated the same need for
new legislation for the poor in America as that generated in England
during Elizabethan times. During the Depression, poverty became an
unmistakeably national problem. 45 What had once been solely the
providence of the states and local charities overwhelmed available resources.' Only the Federal Government was thought capable of alleviating the poverty. The Social Security Act of 1935, implemented in
response to the Depression, was the fundamental legislation in the development of the present-day welfare system. 47The Act established cat39.

L. GREENE, FREE ENTERPRISE WITHOUT POVERTY 45 (1981); W. Bell, AFDC: Symptom and
Potential, in JUBILEE FOR OUR TIMES 231 (A. Schorr ed. 1977); S. Danziger & R. Plotnick,
The War on Income Poverty Achievements and Failures,in WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA:
PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 31-52 (P. Sommers ed. 1982); R. Lerman, Discussion, SingleParentHouseholds under Alternative Transfer and Tax Systems, in INCOME-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS: THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST 446 (I. Garfinkel ed. 1982); H. Aaron, Why is
Welfare so Hard to Reform? in STUDIES IN SOCIAL ECONOMICS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITU-

TION 1, 7, 8, 11, 16 (1973); Interview with Deborah Colton, Policy Associate with the American Public Welfare Association, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1983); C. Murray, Safety Nets
and the Truly Needy." Rethinking the Social Welfare System, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 1,

2 (1982); Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, supra note 1, at 17; But see W. Albrecht,
Welfare Reform- An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone, in WELFARE REFORM IN
AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 15-28 (P. Sommers ed. 1982).

40.
41.

See authorities cited at supra note 39.
W. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE

STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN

AMERICA 6 (1974).

Id. at 6-12.
See Role of Government, supra note 29, at 2.
Id. at 3. The 1929 stock market crash precipitated a severe economic depression which lasted
several years. Millions of workers lost their jobs and their life's savings when factories and
banks closed. Poverty and suffering existed on a larger scale than had ever been known in
the United States. W. TRATTNER, supra note 41, at 228-29.
45. W. TRATTNER, supra note 41, at 229; J. Hansen, An Overview of the State-Federal Relationship in Public Welfare Programs2 (Feb. 1982) (unpublished manuscript) (available from the
National Conference on Social Welfare) [hereinafter cited as An Overview].
46. Id.
47. An Overview, supra note 45, at 2; Role of Government, supra note 29, at 3.
42.
43.
44.
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egories of federally-funded aid to those unable to work, which at that
time included the blind, the aged, the disabled, and dependent children
without fathers.4 8 The major criterion for the Aid to Dependent Children program (now known as AFDC) was, and still is, the continued
absence of the child's father.4 9
The AFDC grants provided financial support in lieu of that which
would normally have been provided by the father to the children.5"
Other programs were created to put able-bodied men back to work,5 '
however, in the mainstream society of the 1930's a woman with children
was not expected to work outside the home;52 her role was solely to
grants were meant to enable the
care for the home and children. These
53
mother to fulfill her role at home.
Since this meager beginning in 1935, the AFDC program has grown
tremendously. Its growth doubled between 1947 and 1957, 54 doubled
again between 1957 and 1967, 55 then doubled once more in the five
years between 1967 and 1972.56 The total expenditure through the
AFDC program in 1980 was approximately $12.9 billion. 7 The Federal Government's share of the bill was approximately $6.9 billion.5 8
Popular Myths and Misconceptions
The cause of the present-day public misconception of AFDC is that
American society underwent a tremendous social and moral change after AFDC was conceived and implemented. In essence, two key premises underlying the program changed. First, increasing numbers of
women with children are now working outside the home, even in two
parent families.5 9 Women who work outside the home, even though
they have small children, are rapidly becoming the norm. 60 Consequently, the very idea that an able-bodied female can get government
"hand-outs" to stay at home, while taxpayers must work outside the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.

Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)); L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 47.
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
H. Watts, G. Jakubson & F. Skidmore, Single-ParentHouseholds Under Alternative Transfer
and Tax Systems, in INCOME-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS: THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST
410 (I. Garfinkel ed. 1982).
Work Relief and Public Works Appropriation Act of 1938, ch. 554, 52 Stat. 809. The programs terminated as provided in section one of the Act.
H. Watts, G. Jakubson & F. Skidmore, supra note 50, at 410-11.
L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 36; H. Watts, G. Jakubson & F. Skidmore, supra note 50, at
410-11.
S. LEVITAN, supra note 38, at 30.
Id.
Id.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CASH AND NON-CASH BENEFITS FOR PERSONS WITH
LIMITED INCOME: ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE DATA 3 (Report No.

83-110) (1983) (prepared by V. Burke).
Id. at 172.

59.

In an estimated 51.4% of American married couples the wife works outside the home. The

60.

Average Family, Then and Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1983, at 79.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1983, at C13, col. 1.
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home, breeds public contempt for the program. Second, a tremendous
increase in single parenting has occurred since the 1930's.6 1 When
AFDC was first implemented, the predominant cause of the fathers'
absence was his death.62 Congress did not anticipate the relatively new
and still growing group of never-wed or divorced parents. 63 Yet, in the
poverty-stricken population that includes AFDC recipients as well as
the general American population, the number of single parents continues to grow.6' In fact, some estimates indicate that almost half the children born in the early 1970's will live in a single parent home before
age eighteen. 5 In the majority of instances the mother has custody of
the dependent children.6 6 In essence, this relatively new breed of eligible recipients has changed the public concept of AFDC from its traditional "help-the-(worthy)-widow" image to one of rewarding careless
illegitimacy and marital failure. This image, coupled with that of the
lazy but able-bodied unemployed female, casts AFDC in an extremely
unfavorable light in public opinion. The social, economic, and moral
grounds upon which the parameters of AFDC were originally conceived no longer exist in modern America.
Aside from the change in the socio-economic setting, the internal
structures of AFDC and other welfare programs badly need reform.
AFDC and its related welfare programs are riddled with duplication
and overlapping services, a multiplicity of eligibility criteria, run-away
costs, work disincentives, administrative mismanagement and cheating
by recipients. 67 Eligibility levels and other administrative rules and regulations are implemented to allay public fear and distrust of the program, but they increase bureaucracy and administrative costs and add
to the complexity of the program itself.
Unfortunately, attempts to improve the program's poor public image have created additional problems for the recipients and have further damaged its public image. For example, eligibility regulations
designed to prevent assistance to all except the truly needy have in fact
created a work disincentive.6 8 An AFDC mother earning a minimal
61.

Statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, before the House
Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families (a copy of which is on file at the offices
of the Journal of Legislation). See also 129 CONG. REc. D572 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1983).

62.
63.

L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 47.
H. AARON, supra note 39, at 7.

64.
65.

N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1983 at C13, col. i; See Statement of A. Rivlin, supra note 61.
TheAverageAmerican Family, Then andNow, supra note 59, at 79; H. Watts, G. Jakubson &
F. Skidmore, supra note 50, at 410-11.
See Statement of A. Rivlin, supra note 61.

66.
67.

68.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WORK DISINCENTIVES AND INCOME MAINTENANCE
PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 9 (REPORT. No. 80-119 E) (1980);

Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, supra note 1, at 18-20; J. Turem, Can We Fix AFDC" It
is Time to Consider Possibilities.Apart From Ideology and Budget, 40 PUB. WELFARE 27 (Fall
1982).
T. Joe, supra note 22, at ii. This 1982 study on the proposed FY 1983 Federal budget predicted that:
Incomes for working AFDC families would be reduced so much that parents who
work would generally be little better off - or worse off - than AFDC mothers who
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income at a low paying job ends up having less for her family than she

would by not working at all.6 9 Thus, she stays at home, furthering the

public notion of welfare laziness.
The AFDC program, as it presently exists, has insurmountable
problems. A new system is needed - a system premised upon modem
concepts of working mothers and present-day economic realities. The
overriding obstacle to true welfare reform, however, is not the difficult

task of developing a comprehensible, affordable program of caring for
poor children. The problem is in overcoming the public and legislative
fear of welfare. In a tightening economy with high unemployment,7"
taxpayers are fearful of seeing their paychecks decrease as others live
"on the dole." Legislators are hesitant to even consider attempting reform because they fear alienating the public. AFDC recipients, unlike
other segments of the population, generally do not have strong election
day turnouts. Although other segments of the population receive various government benefits,7 ' the AFDC segment has received more than
its fair share of criticism because of misunderstandings about the program's nature and purpose. Until the public becomes more aware of
the background and purpose of AFDC, it is unlikely that needed reform will be politically feasible.
SOCIAL SECURITY: MIDDLE CLASS WELFARE?
Many programs which provide federal assistance to individuals are
not generally perceived as welfare. Well-known examples include student loans and interest payments, FHA loans, and tax deductions for
mortgage interest payments. Social Security is frequently described as
an "insurance" program, 72 but it provides beneficiaries with an annual
income based partially on their actual or legislatively perceived
needs.7 3 Surprisingly, Social Security does not require its recipients to
undergo rigorous scrutiny in overcoming eligibility requirements as
do not work. In 24 of the 48 states included in the study, the AFDC working mother
earning average wages would end up with less dispensable income than the AFDC
mother who does not work . . . . These 24 states include 65 percent of all AFDC

69.

70.
71.
72.
73.

working parents.
See also L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 32, 42; W. Bell, supra note 39, at 243.
Because Medicaid and food stamp eligibility is often based on the same criteria as AFDC
eligibility, a person who attains income to become disqualified for AFDC benefits may also
lose Medicaid and food stamp coverage. Even if the income is sufficient to offset the loss of
AFDC payments, the disqualification for these two related programs may cause a net loss of
support for the family. W. Bell, supra note 39, at 243. See also L. GREENE, supra note 39, at
32.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1983, at A12, col. I.
See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). The Social Security Act refers to the fund in which taxes are deposited as the "Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund."
Note the minimum benefit provision instituted in the 1939 amendments to the Social Security
Act, § 209(e)(1), 53 Stat. 1360 (1939) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(m) (1976 & Supp. II
1978) (repealed 1981) (reinstated by Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-123, 95 Stat. 1661)).
Also, the average beneficiary gets more out of the program than he puts into it. See R.
Myers & B. Schobel, supra note 28.
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does the AFDC program.7 4 Furthermore, recipients of Social Security
do not carry the stigma that follows the recipients of AFDC. There is a
pervasive and significant welfare element embodied in Social Security,
but it is often rationalized as merely a "good deal" for those middle
class recipients fortunate enough to participate in the largest income
transfer program in the United States.75
Advent of Social Security
Compulsory social insurance is the hallmark of the welfare state.76
The social collapse following the Great Depression informed this nation's political leaders that laissez-faire capitalism could not remedy the
extreme crisis of ten million citizens unemployed and eighteen million
people dependent upon emergency relief.77 Attitudes toward social welfare changed across the nation as a new theme of federal policymaking
emerged.78 Federal and state governments became underwriters and insurers of the individual's employment, health, income, family and
many risks of modem industrial society. 79 Today, Social Security is the
single largest federal program designed to insure retirees and others
against loss of income in old age.8"
Congress originally designed Social Security to meet the problems
of the urban, lower middle class of the 1930's.1 Initially, the benefit
schedule provided only a minimal retirement income for recipients.8 2
Over the next four decades Congress amended the program to include
survivors, disabled workers, and health insurance recipients.8 3 Congress regularly increased benefit levels and expanded the number of
workers contributing to the program. 4 Although it originally resem74.
75.
76.

Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (Social Security eligibility standards)
with 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982) (food stamp eligibility standards) and 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976 &
Supp. 11 1978) (AFDC eligibility standards).
See R. Myers & B. Schobel, supra note 28.
S. Danziger and R. Plotnick, Income Maintenance Programsand the Pursuitof Income Security, ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 130 (1980); H. Girvetz, Welfare

77.

State, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 512 (D. Sills ed.
1968); STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: INCOME SECURITY 59 (R. Stevens ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as STATUTORY HISTORY].
2 A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 297-315

78.

(1959).
See generally id.

79.
80.

See generally Y. AHARONI, THE No-RISK SOCIETY (1981); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1979).
B. PAGE, WHO GETS WHAT FROM GOVERNMENT 63 (1982); P. Peterson, SocialSecurity. The

81.
82.

STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 11.
A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 155 (1977); STATUTORY HISTORY, supra

Coming Crash, 29 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 34 (Dec. 2, 1982).
note 76, at 136, 170.
83.

For the amendments to include survivors, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch.

666, 53 Stat. 1360 (1939). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 246-49, 251. For
amendments to include the disabled, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 666,
64 Stat. 477 (1950). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 484, 488. For amend-

ments to include health insurance, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 750-58.
84.

Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360; Social Security Act Amendments of 1946, ch. 951, 60 Stat. 978; Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, 64
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bled an insurance plan in which benefits were based on the worker's
total contributions, the 1939 amendments shaped the program into a
strange hybrid of insurance and social welfare characteristics that distributed benefits based on the worker's average monthly earnings.8 5
The history and structure of the Social Security system show that
although the system mainly benefits the middle class, it contains significant welfare aspects. While members of the middle class may have
contempt for lower income welfare recipients, many middle to upper
class members also receive welfare in various forms but with no stigma.
Background
The history of Social Security tells the story of American social reform. Prevailing attitudes toward social insurance crumbled during the
Depression.86 New federal and state programs developed to soften the

impact of unemployment in old age.87 The 1935 Social Security Act

established a system of benefits for the aged, blind, dependent children
and survivors.88 As one historian described the purpose of the Act:
"[o]verall then, the 1935 Social Security Act seemed calculated to overturn a system born of the worst excesses of laissezfaire capitalism."8 9
The law originally intended to create a system closely resembling a
fully-funded insurance plan based on employment.9" Under the original system, workers would contribute a small portion of their earnings
to trust funds so that upon retirement at age 65, they would begin to
receive benefits proportionate to their total contributions.9 Social Security also resembled an annuity because benefits were related to life-

85.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Stat. 1, 477; Social Security Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206, 68 Stat. '1052; Social Security
Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, 70 Stat. 807; Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-840, 72 Stat. 1013; Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 925;
Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, 75 Stat. 131; Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286; Social Security Amendments of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821; Social Security Amendments of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
83 Stat. 737; Act of March 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-5, 85 Stat. 5; Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-66, 87 Stat. 152; Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat.
1509. See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 247, 303, 372, 505, 529, 584, 609, 758;
A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 164-65, 170, 171, 181, 184.
See generally A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 5-7; R. CAMPBELL, SOCIAL SECURITY: PROMISE
AND REALITY 10-12, 13, 14, 58-63, 71-82 (1977); A. ROBERTSON, THE COMING REVOLUTION
IN SOCIAL SECURITY 13-28, 108-10, 306 (1981); STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 6, 815, 223, 224, 226, 228, 229; P. Peterson, The Salvation of Social Security, 29 N.Y. REV. BOOKS
50-57 (1982); Telephone interview with Rudolph Penner, American Enterprise Institute, in
Washington, D.C. (July 20, 1983).
See 2 A. SCHLESINGER, upra note 77.
STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 4-12. See generallyAn Overview, supra note 45, at 2,
3, 9; R. LEVY, T. LEWIS & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND
THE INDIVIDUAL 44-60 (1971).
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397
(1976 & Supp. V. 1981)). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 167.
STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 10.
Id. at 127, 227-30.
Id. at 169; The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531 § 201(a), 49 Stat. 620 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). This Act set up a reserve account in the U.S.
Treasury for these purposes.
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time earnings. 92 Much like a fully-funded pension plan, taxes or
contributions were held in a reserve fund until the individual became
eligible for benefits. 93
Within four years of passing the Social Security Act, Congress significantly altered the insurance aspects of the legislation.9 4 The
amended Act of 1939 emphasized social welfare and social adequacy
rather than a return of the worker's contributions. 9 Congress emphasized social adequacy by adding a minimum benefit provision entitling
individuals to a minimum monthly payment regardless of whether that
payment exceeded the individual's average contributions. 96 The
amendments also set up a new pay-as-you-go plan which based benefits
on the contributor's average wage rather than on his or her total earnings, as the previous plan had done. 97 Instead of accumulating a reserve fund, contributions (tax revenues) were immediately paid to
current retirees with excesses retained in a new trust fund. 98 The
amended Act thus moved the system away from the insurance plan
Congress originally envisaged, and replaced it with a plan containing a
number of characteristics usually found in need-based welfare programs, such as minimum benefits and benefits in excess of
contributions.
Following this major, relatively unpublicized legislative change,
each Administration after Roosevelt from 1938 to 1983 pressured Congress to increase both the number of workers covered by Social Security and the amount of benefits paid retirees. 99 In almost all instances
Congress responded generously. In 1954, Congress added disability insurance to the program.l °° Medical insurance followed in 1965.01 By
the time President Johnson ushered in his "Great Society" programs in
the mid- 1960's, Social Security was politically "sacrosanct." 10 2 As a reSee STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76.
See The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 620.
The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. This Act completely
amended Title II of the original act to set up a trust fund, changing the benefit formula from
"cumulative lifetime earnings after 1936" to "average earnings in covered work." See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 242, 247.
95. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. See STATUTORY HISTORY,
supra note 76, at 242, 247.
96. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 209(e)(1), 53 Stat. 1360. Portions of
this Act established a minimum benefit. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 247-52.
97. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. See also STATUTORY
HISTORY, supra note 76, at 247-52. A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 110, 127, 128.
98. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360.
99. See Statutory History, supra note 76, at 247, 303, 372, 505, 529, 584, 609, 758, 884. The
Social Security Amendments, supra note 84 often resulted from the efforts by each administration to enlarge the Social Security system as discussed in STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note
76, at 95, 315, 489, 601, 663, 687, 707, 884.
100. Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-767, 68 Stat. 1130 (1954). See also
STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 485.
101. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). See
also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 758.
102. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 5; D. Koitz, G. Kollman & N. Miller, Financing
Social Security. Options consideredin 1983, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 4 (Issue
Brief No.82-126, archived May 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as FinancingSocial Security].
92.
93.
94.
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suit of the changes in Social Security and because Congress indexed
benefits to the Consumer Price Index in 1972 to allow for inflation during the 1970's, expenditures for Social Security rose from sixteen billion
in 1965 to over 100 billion in 1980.03 Even when adjusted for inflation
the total amount expended for Social Security from 1940 to 1980 has
increased substantially."° In 1960 Social Security constituted 12.6%" ° '
of the Federal budget, as compared to 20.6% in 1980.1°
Thus, the Social Security system no longer resembles the fullyfunded insurance program originally designed by Congress in 1935.107
In addition to providing a marginal insurance plan, Congress amended
the program to focus on eliminating poverty among the aged by redistributing income from workers to retirees.'
After the 1939 amendments, the system no longer related the benefits workers received to
their payroll contributions, but rather linked benefits, in a rough fashion, to the worker's average wage.' 0 9 The 1939 amendments also secured minimum monthly benefits for those workers whose
contributions were insufficient." 0 Because Congress has expanded the
system by including more employees and increasing their benefits and
because the system is funded by a pay-as-you-go financing method,
most retirees and benefit recipients since 1940 have received much
more in benefits than they ever contributed."' Therefore, the Social
Security program is no longer simply an insurance program. It has significant welfare aspects, because benefits are based on the needs of the
recipients. Today Social Security benefits have essentially two main socioeconomic effects: to reduce poverty among the elderly, and to redistribute income from workers to the older retired sector.12
NATURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY-INSURANCE OR WELFARE?
Social Security is financed with a regressive payroll tax which
places a greater burden on lower income earners. 113 This vertical inequity is somewhat balanced by the marginally progressive benefit struc103. B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 65; FinancingSocial Security, supra note 102, at 4 (Table 1); P.
Martin, The Art of Decoupling: Keeping Social Security's Promise Up to Date, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 748-800 (1980).
104. Y. AHARONI, supra note 79, at 98-109; B. PAGE, supra note 80; Financing Social Security,

supra note 102, at 4 (Table 1).
105. FinancingSocial Security, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76.

108. B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 63; Telephone interview with Rudolph Penner, supra note 85.
109. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
110. Id.

111. R. Myers & B. Schobel, supra note 28.
112. B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 63; P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 50. Telephone interview with
Rudolph Penner, supra note 85. See generally G. TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF INCOME
DISTRIBUTION (1983).
113. R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85, at 6-9; A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 89-90; B. PAGE, supra

note 80, at 66, 67. A regressive tax is a tax that has a greater incidence on lower income
earners; that is, dollar for dollar, lower income earners pay a greater percent of their total
income than higher income earners under such a tax.
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ture." 14 Consequently income is redistributed from higher income
classes to lower income classes. In essence, higher level income earners
receive a larger absolute share under the system, but they receive proportionately less than lower income contributors. Nevertheless, most
beneficiaries receive substantially similar benefits regardless of their
contribution."1 5 The redistribution of income through the benefit structure reveals that the primary function of Social Security is to eliminate
poverty in old age.
Social Security also redistributes income from the young to the old.
The pay-as-you-go system taxes present-day workers to pay benefits to
today's retirees, survivors, disabled, sick and dependent children.' 16
The system requires a large ratio of workers to retirees." 7 Because
workers have historically far outnumbered retirees, Congress has been
able to enact benefit increases each year." 8 If the proportion of workers to retirees becomes too small, then payroll contributions will be insufficient to meet the demands of the program. Social Security benefits
to the retirees may then have to be reduced. Because the average age
of Americans is rising,"I9 each year there are more retirees demanding
Social Security benefits. 120 Thus, each year the cost of redistributing
income from the earner to the retiree becomes greater and the ability of
the government to transfer income from the earner to the retiree becomes more difficult.' 2 ' Sometime in the next century, payroll taxes
must be significantly raised, benefit levels cut, or both.'12 The abundant benefits enjoyed by present retirees will not be available to the
future retirees whose payroll taxes currently support the system, unless
payroll taxes rise with the increasing proportion of retirees. 23 The
payroll tax workers pay must rise to supply benefits for the steadily
increasing number of retirees, but the number of workers is not rising
fast enough to provide sufficient revenues. 24
114. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67; R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85, at 6-9. Because the benefit

structure is progressive, the more the earner contributes, the higher the total monthly amount
the earner receives at retirement. The Social Security benefit structure is only marginally
progressive, that is, the earner does not receive an extra dollar for every additional dollar
contributed, but somewhat less, as the earner's total contributions pass a specified amount.
The actual benefit structure is complex and technical. For a detailed account, see generally
R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85.
115. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67; R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85, at 6-9.
116. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text. The 1939 Social Security Amendments, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360, changed the program to a pay-as-you-go system. See generally
A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 84.
117. See U.S. NATIONAL COMMISION ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 55-59 (1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM].

118. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76 and accompanying text; A. MUNNELL, supra note
82, at 160-61, 172-81.
119. See REPORT ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, supra note 117, at 76, 79.

120. Id. at 293 (Table 11).
121. See P. Peterson, supra note 80, at 37-38.
122. See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 51-54, 56, 81-104, 290-92; P. PETERSON, supra note 80,
at 37-38.
123. See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 51-54, 56, 81-104, 290-92.
124. Id
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The Social Security system also redistributes income through the
minimum benefit formula. 2 5 This formula provides that any worker
having worked a minimum number of hours every ninety days will receive a minimum benefit. Thus, in a substantial number of instances
26
benefits do not even remotely match the individual's contributions.
The Social Security system contains far-reaching and substantial
"welfare" aspects since it provides benefits far in excess of individual
contributions. The term "welfare" denotes government programs that
provide payments or services based on need, not previous tax contributions. 27 "Welfare" may also denote government payments in excess of
individuals' tax contributions when the payments are made because of
a perceived need. Social Security resembles welfare because Congress
presumes the elderly need benefit payments far in excess of their contributions to prevent them from falling below the poverty level. 28 Any
payments beyond an individual's contribution are thus based on need,
not earnings. As in other welfare programs, this proportion of Social
Security benefits is neither earned nor contributed by the recipient.
In many respects the program resembles welfare more than insurance; yet unlike welfare, Social Security curiously benefits primarily
middle-income workers. 1 29 In spite of its welfare characteristics, standards of eligibility under Social Security differ substantially from
means-tested programs such as AFDC or Food Stamps. 3° Applicants
for these benefit programs must show need by demonstrating that their
income falls below certain official levels.' 3 ' The scope of inquiry allowed the administrators of such programs to investigate an applicant's
income level is much broader than that of administrators of the Social
Security program. The primary differences in Social Security recipients and AFDC or Food Stamp recipients are the recipient's age, his32
torical and present income, and in the case of AFDC, marital status. 1
The policy distinction appears to derive from historical attitudes which
125. See A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 38, 51-52. The minimum benefit formula was introduced
in 1939 and provided a minimum monthly benefit as a floor for beneficiaries, to provide for
their need.
126. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
127. This is the author's definition based on a functional, not a categorical conception of government benefits. The distinction between need-based programs and contributory programs is
less clear than the public believes or the programs seem to imply.
128. If the total amount that average OASDHI recipients have received in retirement checks
above contributions deducted from their payroll earnings could be compared with the
amount of funds allocated to AFDC and food stamp programs, then a better comparison
would be possible between "welfare" payments to the poor and "welfare" payments to the
middle class.
129. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 32-35.
130. The OASDHI system is also more efficient and enjoys more public support. Compare 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) and 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982) (food stamp program
eligibility standards) with 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (AFDC eligibility
standards).
131. See generally id.
132. 7 U.S.C. § 2014; (1982) (Food Stamp eligibility standards); 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976 & Supp. II
1978) (AFDC eligibility standards); 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (Social Security
entitlement status).
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place a heavier burden on the poor to prove their claims under the
relevant programs.' 3 3 Myths behind Social Security, on the other
hand, absolve recipients under the program from this burden because
many believe that these benefits are entirely earned.
The primary myth surrounding Social Security benefits is that they
are earned. In contrast, the public perceives AFDC and Food Stamp
benefits as "handouts." While many needy persons must struggle to
subsist on AFDC and Food Stamps, middle-income Social Security recipients receive benefits many times exceeding their original contributions. 134 These excess benefits might also be called "handouts" but
usually the public rationalizes them as a "good deal." The public generally does not perceive these inequities, but if it did, Congress probably could no longer justify this middle class welfare program. 3 5 The
American system of social welfare perpetuates present economic ineq136
uities based on outmoded attitudes and public misperceptions.
For example, the Federal Government has characterized Social Security as insurance since the act was passed in 1935.137 Government
officials use terms such as "insurance," "beneficiary," "premium,"
"earned right," "insured worker" and "insured status." 138 This unfortunate use of words confuses the public and misleads it into overlooking
the welfare aspects inherent in the system. The myth perpetuates itself
since taxes come from employment earnings and are paid into a separate trust fund 13 9 rather than into the general treasury fund. The myth
that Social Security is insurance fails because benefits are structured
not on continual contributions, but to protect individuals against poverty and income inequality in old age. Finally, unlike the Social Security System, no private insurance program structures its benefits to favor
lower income classes while requiring beneficiaries to make compulsory
contributions
and satisfy statutory conditions in order to receive
0
benefits. 14
Social Security has evolved into the largest federal income transfer
program designed to protect middle class wage earners against poverty
in old age.' 4 1 In 1981, retirees under the plan received an average benefit of $4,614 a year. 142 Still, only nine percent of benefits paid under the
program go to individuals below the official poverty level. 14 3 A full
thirty percent go to those who have incomes between the poverty level
133.
134.
135.
136.

SeeAn Overview, supra note 45, at 3-9.
See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
See R. MYERS & B. SCHOBEL, supra note 28, at 39.
STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 242, 247.

137. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, the comments of President Roosevelt upon signing
the Social Security Act, at 166-67, 247.
138. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST
FUND, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 46, 84 (1983) [hereinafter cited as BOARD OF TRUSTEES].

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976 and Supp. 11 1978).
Id.
See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
Id.
See P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 53. See also OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, So-
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and twice that level.44
Admittedly, Social Security has lifted large numbers of individuals
from the poverty level. 45 Nevertheless, total expenditures for the Social Security program have generally exceeded the entire outlay for
food stamps, AFDC, Medicaid and Supplementary Security Income. 146
In simple dollars expended, welfare for the poor falls far short of welfare for the middle class. 47 A remarkable thirty percent of Social Security benefits goes to the top twenty percent of retiree households.
These households are the most prosperous in the United States and
receive forty percent of the nation's total income. 48 One may wonder
why a system aimed at alleviating poverty and redistributing income to
lower income groups pays these sums to the wealthiest classes. One
reason is that if higher income classes were cut out of Social Security,
the program could no longer maintain its broad base of acceptance and
a stigma would overshadow benefits. The focus of the system would
then shift entirely to eliminating poverty.
The benefits presently paid to the average Social Security recipient
will far outweigh contributions until well into the next century. 49 Social Security expenditures can not continue to rise at this rate because
the American population continues to age and birth rates continue to
fall.'
Even the minimal change brought by immigration alone will
not be enough to increase government revenues to support the elderly
in the twenty-first century.' 5 ' Current myths, propounded by opportunists and short-sighted public officials, do nothing but further postpone the attention and the leadership this situation calls for.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The public does not understand the nature of Social Security and
the rocks toward which the ship of middle class entitlements is headed.
The system needs long-term financial reform beginning with realistic
projections of future economic and demographic trends of the working
population by the trustees of Social Security. Future recipients cannot
base their retirement plans on present unrealistic projections which derive from unduly optimistic economic and demographic assumptions. 5 2 So long as taxes under the Social Security system and worker
CIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

STAFF PAPER No. 41, INCOME OF THE POPULATION 55 AND OVER 54 (1981).

144. See P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 53.
145. See FinancingSocial Security, supra note 102, at 4. Only 9.5% of Americans aged 55 to 64 and
15.7% of those 65 and older lived in poverty in 1960 compared with 21.5% and 35.2% for each
group respectively in 1980 as shown by Table 1. See also B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 63-65.
146. See Y. AHARONI, supra note 79, at app.
147. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
148. See P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 53.
149. See generally A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 82-99.
150. See REPORT ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, supra note 117, at 43, 79.
151. See A. Munnell, A Calmer Look at Social Security, 30 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 41 (1983); R.
Rinder, We Can Afford to Support the Elderly, 30 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 46 (1983).
152. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, supra note 138, at 2-5, 34, 45-49.
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participation are compulsory, Congress should have a legal duty to
guarantee present-day workers a fair return on their payroll contributions while re-establishing a benefit structure which is reasonably related to workers' contributions. Congress should examine why middle
income earners in retirement presently receive benefits exceeding many
times their contributions to the program, while AFDC and food stamp
recipients must carry a heavier burden to receive their welfare benefits.
Each contributor should receive an annual benefit statement to show
what he or she has contributed. 5 3 Each contributor should know what
benefits are forthcoming and receive current and accurate statements
and projections of Social Security trust funds from year to year, and
decade to decade. If workers must participate in the system to prevent
poverty among the elderly, then they deserve a disclosure of the solvency of the system. Future demographic and economic trends will
seriously threaten the Social Security system. Social Security cannot
continue to provide benefits at the present rate in the next century. The
system should be reformed by disclosing to the public the real purpose
and the long-term insolvency of this major income-transfer program.
The program cannot simply continue on the same course of annual financing increases and broadening the benefit structure by Congress.
To do so would leave a bleak future for today's worker.
CONCLUSION
When President Roosevelt wrote his plan in 1935 for social security,' 54 he perceived the changing needs of American social and economic structure. American society had evolved, at that point, from a
rural farming community where a person could survive by living off the
land, to an urban industrial society where the cities no longer met the
needs of all its inhabitants. His program reflected this need and created
a fallback system for those who were victims of that change.
As American society enters a highly technological age, machines
are replacing many unskilled laborors. 5 5 The system that President
Roosevelt created in the 1930's was never designed to meet today's
problems. It was never intended to deal with permanent unemployment. Rather it was designed to provide assistance only until every
member of society was fully employed.
Existing subsidy programs reflect the idea that large groups of people in our society - children, students, the disabled, blind, and infirmed - cannot be expected to seek employment. Those whose skills
are not needed by society are also entitled to draw benefits regardless of
whether they fit into a particular category, until they can be retrained
or society again has a need for their services.
153. See generally A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 111-21 for this suggestion.
154. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 242. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 77.
155. Manufacturing Is in Flower, TIME, March 26, 1984, at 50-52.
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Americans at every income level receive significant subsidies from
the Federal Government, such as home mortgage assistance, student
loans, and Social Security benefits. Yet, the people who are in greatest
need are living below the poverty level and are labeled as undeserving.
This label of "undeserving poor" developed despite the substantial similarities between programs such as AFDC and Social Security, which
are targeted for very different groups of people but meet similar needs.
When closely examined, the conclusion that Social Security recipients are worthy and AFDC recipients are unworthy is illogical. The
paralyzing myths defining government benefit plans must be discarded
now and an uncategorized, integrated plan must be enacted to meet
human needs in America.
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APPENDIX I
INDICATORS OF SOCIAL SECURITY'S GROWTH AND
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
1960

1980
(OA SDI)*
12.6%
Expenditure as % of Federal budget ............
20.6%
2.33%
Expenditure as % of GNP ......................
4.79%
3.0%
Tax rates .............................
5.08%
Taxes paid by worker with average earnings .... $120.21
$635.68
115 million
73 million
Covered workers ...............................
35 million
14 million
Beneficiaries ...................................
5.1 to 1
Worker to beneficiary ratios ....................
3.3 to 1
Earnings replacement for new retirees (benefits
as a % of final earnings for average
33.3%
earner) ....................................
51.1%
5.6%
2.8%
Social security as % of personal income .........
Poverty trends (% in poverty) 1959 and 1980
9.5%
21.5%
Age 55 to 64 ...............................
35.2%
15.7%
Age 65 and older ..........................
22.4%
Total population ...........................
13.0%
* Note: Excludes Health Insurance
SOURCES:

D. Koitz, G. Kollman & N. Miller, Financing Social Security: Options Considered in 1983, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 4, at Table 1 (Issue
Brief No. 82-126 archived May 16, 1983).

